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Wrongful Discharge: Toward a More Efficient
Remedy
JEFFREY L. HARRISON*
The common law rules governing remedies for breach of an employ-
ment contract by an employer are well established. The same rules are
generally applied when there is no contract but a claim for back pay
arises from a discharge that is statutorily prohibited.' The employee is
*B.S. 1967, M.B.A. 1968, Ph.D. 1970, The University of Florida; J.D. 1977, The University
of North Carolina. Associate Professor of Law, The University of Houston.
See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.25 (1973).
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III 1979), makes unlawful employment
practices which unjustifiably discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin. Section 706(f) of the Act, id. § 2000e-5(f) (1976), authorizes private persons or
the federal government to bring suit where violations of the Act have allegedly occurred. It
also allows intervention by interested parties in suits already commenced. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
The remedial section of the Act is § 706(g), id. § 2000e-5(g), which authorizes the courts to grant
relief in the form of "such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay .... or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."
In addition, id. § 2000e-6(a) authorizes "pattern or practice" employment discrimination
suits by the federal government, and also authorizes the government to request such relief
as may be necessary "to insure the full enjoyment of the rights" protected by the statute.
Annot., 21 A.L.R. Fed. 472 (1974).
The measurement of backpay awards in discrimination suits is essentially the same as
the common law measure of damages in breach of employment contract cases. The language
of the Act seems to require that this measure of damages be followed. "Damages," used in
the context of backpay under Title VII, may be a misnomer, as one court has said that "[t]he
demand for backpay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather is an integral
part of the statutory equitable remedy." Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969); accord, Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th
Cir. 1971). The language of § 706(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), states that
"[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or
persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the backpay otherwise allowable."
Thus, the Act places a duty to minimize on Title VII plaintiffs. This section arguably places
a higher duty to minimize on Title VII plaintiffs than on employees suing for breach of
employment contracts at common law because there is no language limiting the duty to
search for substitute employment to a job of a similar type or salary. The courts, however,
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entitled to the income accruing at the time of the suit plus, if there is a
contract, the present value of the remaining wage installments.' This
amount will be offset by the amount that the defendant is able to show
the plaintiff could have earned4 in positions that are reasonable sub-
stitutes.' If reasonable substitutes are not available, the recovery will
be offset by the actual earnings of the employee that were made possi-
ble by the defendant's breach or prohibited discharge.'
have generally followed the common law duty to minimize in discrimination cases. Some
courts have expressly specified that the common law rule is to be adhered to. See, e.g., Inda
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 565 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974; Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Tex.
1972). Other courts have limited the minimization duty to a search for similar employment.
See, e.g., Lowry v. Whitaker Cable Corp., 472 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1973); Abron v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095 (D.C. Md. 1977). Finally, some courts do not appear to
state a common law type rule, but have measured backpay awards in a manner consistent
with the common law. See, e.g., Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage
Employees, 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387
(7th Cir. 1975); Jurinko v. Edwin L. Weingand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973).
The concept of wrongful discharge has also been applied in cases involving terminable-
at-will employment contracts and situations in which there is no express statutory protec-
tion. In at least one instance the court has based its decision on a contract theory. See
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 132-33, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). In other cases, a
tort theory has been used. See, e.g., Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297
N.E.2d 425 (1973); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119
(1978). Under either theory, the remedy used seems to be similar to the basic common law
remedy. Since these are relatively recent developments, and since the policy issues involv-
ed are different from those in traditional wrongful discharge cases, this article does not
deal directly with them. See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the A busive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404
(1967); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust DismissaL" Time for a Statute, 62
VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
' See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 158 (1935); notes 27-39 & accompanying text in-
fra.
, If the contract period has not passed, the offset will also equal the amounts obtainable
in reasonable substitute positions.
I Elkhart Rubber Works v. Nerf, 46 Ind. App. 332, 92 N.E. 553 (1910; Schiller v. Keuffel
& Esser Co., 21 Wis. 2d 545, 124 N.W.2d 646 (1963); see notes 36-39 & accompanying text in-
fra.
The issue is generally referred to as one involving a duty to mitigate damages. There
are two problems with this terminology. First, there is really no "duty" in the sense that
failure to comply with a duty would give rise to a cause of action. Instead, failure to comply
with the duty creates a situation in which the plaintiff cannot recover for avoidable conse-
quences. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 33, at 128. Despite this imprecision, the word
"duty" will be used in this article to indicate the avoidable consequences problem.
The second problem is that, rather than " mitigate," the plaintiff is technically expected
to "minimize" damages. The two terms may refer to very different concepts. See D. DOBBS,
supra note 1, § 3.7, at 188. In order to avoid confusion the article will use the term
"minimize."
' If the plaintiff accepts a position which he could have held at the same time as the
original position, the earnings generally are not credited to the defendant. See D. DOBBS,
supra note 1, § 12.25, at 925; 5 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 232 (1948) (wages should be credited to
defendant to mitigate damages).
Likewise, the discharging employer typically is not credited with the income from an ad-
ditional contract if either the original contract or the new one is not for purely personal ser-
[Vol. 56:207
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Although many common law rules are economically efficient,7 this
does not appear to be true in the case of wrongful discharge. The com-
mon law rule creates what is, in effect, a one hundred percent tax on
earnings from nonsubstitute employment; the dischai'ged worker who is
unable to find a reasonable substitute has no pecuniary incentive to
return to the labor force. Unless there are substantial psychic rewards
associated with the nonsubstitute employment, the individual would
maximize his utility by remaining idle.'
The consequent loss in production is not necessarily inefficient.
Leisure is likely to be a crucial element of everyone's utility function9
and maximization of social welfare involves a healthy amount of leisure.
The current remedial scheme, however, encourages suboptimal leisure.
Even leisure is subject to diminishing marginal utility. That is, at some
point the additional satisfaction derived from an additional hour of
leisure declines."0 If the worker were able to retain his earnings, he
would return to work when obtainable income"-a measure of the value
of labor to society-compensates for leisure foregone plus the disutility
of working. 2 Under the common law rule, however, wrongfully discharg-
ed workers will remain idle, absent reasonable substitutes, until either
the disutility associated with leisure"3 or the psychic rewards from work
are great enough to compensate for the leisure foregone by choosing to
work. The result is that society is unable to bid effectively for the pro-
ductive capacity of the individual even though it may place a higher
value on that productive capacity than the individual places on his
leisure time."
This article proposes and examines three wrongful discharge
remedies designed to decrease suboptimal leisure. Of primary interest
is whether the problem can be effectively treated while protecting the
discharged party's expectancy. 5 The first strategy broadens the defini-
vices. In these instances the "employee" is treated like a seller of goods whose dismissal
has resulted in lost volume. See, e.g., Gould v. McCormick, 75 Wash. 61, 134 P. 676 (1913).
See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25-191 (2d ed. 1977).
Utility is a measure of satisfaction.
See generally T. SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 149-53 (rev. ed. 1971).
,I The individual still derives positive satisfaction from leisure but, after some point,
each additional unit adds less to total satisfaction than those preceding it. For a graphical
analysis, see A. REES, ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY 19-33 (1973).
" Of course, the critical factor is not income per se, but rather the utility associated with
the consumption and saving made possible by the income.
" There are two dimensions to the problem. The fact that utility from leisure is very
slight or negative does not assure a return to work. There are still varying degrees of
disutility associated with work independent of foregone leisure.
,s Of course, the leisure disutility must exceed the disutility of work. See note 12 supra.
" Even if the psychic rewards are great enough to lure the discharged worker back to
work he will still be unable to respond to society's signal (wages) as to where his services
are most valuable. Thus, the presence of psychic rewards does little to alleviate the prob-
lem.
, See notes 91-93 & accompanying text infra.
1981]
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tion of employment the discharged employee must accept in attempting
to minimize losses. Rules similar to this are applied in Texas and in
some cases involving workers discharged in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act. ' This approach requires that the discharged
worker's claim be offset by the amount he earned, or could have earned,
in positions which would not be regarded as reasonable substitutes
under the common law.
The second strategy recognizes the "human capital" element of
labor." "Human capital" is the term economists use to describe labor
which has enhanced productivity because of investments in education,
migration or health. 8 The common law rule, while implicitly recognizing
the concept, does not allow sellers of labor to retain income resulting
from investments in human capital.'9 Application of this strategy would
allow the discharged worker to retain that part of the earnings from
new employment attributable to his investment in human capital.
The final strategy combines features of both the broader duty to
minimize rule and the human capital approach and seems to offer the
greatest promise as an efficient wrongful discharge remedy.2 Under
this "compensated duty" rule, the employee's duty to minimize extends
beyond the common law requirement. Failure to minimize, however,
would not entail an offset equal to the full amount which could have
been earned. Nor would the breaching employer receive full credit for
income earned in nonsubstitute positions.
Although each strategy is designed to increase the efficiency of the
discharged worker's work-leisure decision, each is also likely to have an
impact on the employer's decision to breach or otherwise terminate the
employment contract. Of particular interest is whether any efficiency
gains involved in the worker re-employment decision are offset by less
efficient decisions to terminate by employers.
This article first explains the common law rule and its rationale. A
simple economic model is used to illustrate the interests it protects. Se-
cond, it describes and evaluates the three proposed strategies. Finally,
it analyzes the impact of the common law rule and the three proposed
strategies on the efficiency of the employer's decision to terminate.
THE TRADITIONAL RULE
Rationale
The traditional rule, with its efficiency short-comings, developed
l' See notes 46-86 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 96-111 & accompanying text infra.
IS See notes 112-26 & accompanying text infra.
" See notes 141-43 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 154-63 & accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 56:207
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largely in the aftermath of the doctrine of constructive service.21 This
doctrine required the wrongfully discharged worker to remain ready to
serve through the unexpired term of the contract and to sue for unpaid
wages in indebitatus assumpsit for work done.' This left little room for
any efforts to minimize, since the discharged worker spent this time, at
least constructively, in the service of the original employer.
Gradually the doctrine of constructive service eroded from clashes
with the theory that the action against a discharging employer should be
for damages resulting from the employer's breach'of contract.' Since the
damages action implied a minimization requirement, courts found it at-
tractive as a way of preventing the idleness of discharged workers. In a
New York opinion,24 the doctrine of constructive service was characteriz-
ed as "wholly irreconcilable to the great and beneficent rule ... , that a per-
son discharged from service must not remain idle, but must accept
employment elsewhere if offered."25 The same court described the concept
as being "at war ... with the rules of political economy, as it encourages
idleness and gives compensation to men who fold their arms and decline
service, equal to those who perform with willing hands their stipulated
amount of labor.1
26
For purposes of this article, three aspects of the modern rule are
noteworthy. First, although a reasonable effort to minimize damages
does not require an individual to accept employment beyond a position
which is substantially similar to his previous position, it is impossible to
define just how far the duty to minimize extends. The problem is il-
lustrated in Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.' In Parker,
the plaintiff had contracted to play the lead in a musical entitled
Bloomer Girl.' The production company decided not to make the film
and offered the plaintiff the lead in a western, which she declined. The
lower court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff for the full con-
tract wage,2 and the defendant appealed, claiming that an issue of fact
existed as to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's refusal to accept the
role offered as a substitute.2 The Supreme Court of California found for
2 See generally 14 MINN. L. REV. 819 (1930); 1 MINN. L. REV. 528 (1917); 31 YALE L.J. 441
(1921).
1 See, e.g., Wilkenson v. Black, 80 Ala. 329 (1885); Beck v. Thompson, 108 Ga. 242, 33
S.E. 894 (1899); Allen v. Colliery Eng'rs Co., 196 Pa. 512, 46 A. 899 (1900). See generally C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 158.
1 See, e.g., Little Butte Consol. Mines Co. v. Girand, 14 Ariz. 9,123 P. 309 (1912); Doherty v.
Schipper & Block, 250 Ill. 128, 95 N.E. 74 (1911); James v. County of Allen, 44 Ohio St. 226, 6
N.E. 246 (1886).
2, Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362 (1875), cited in Annot., 8 A.L.R. 338, 347 (1920).
61 N.Y. at 373.
3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970).
Id. at 179, 474 P.2d at 690, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
29 id.
31 Id. at 181, 474 P.2d at 691, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
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the plaintiff, applying the rule that the discharged worker need not ac-
cept "different or inferior employment."31 In dissent, Acting Chief
Justice Sullivan noted that a difference per se rule that did not require
that the rejected employment be inferior or, at least, different in kind
would substantially undermine the minimization requirement.2
Although it is not clear that the court actually applied a per se rule, it
is clear that a multitude of phrases have been used to describe the duty
to minimize.3 Courts are in the predicament of attempting to protect
the benefit of the bargain of the employee 34 while encouraging efforts to
minimize damages. Thus, even though it is somewhat vague, Professor
McCormick's description of the rule as one requiring the discharged
worker to "only search for, or accept, employment of a like rank and
grade, in the same kind of work, in the same locality, ' 35 comes as close
as possible to a concise statement of the worker's obligations.
Second, although the actual measure of damages may resemble the
contract-minus-market-value measure found in the sale of goods," the
route to this result is considerably different. Wrongful discharge
damages are usually measured by the full contract wage offset by the
amount the defendant is able to show the plaintiff earned or could have
earned through reasonable efforts.3 7 The market value concept employed,
unlike that used in the sale of goods, is not the going rate for a particular
type of employment.3 8 For example, a party who has wrongfully
discharged a law professor will not be permitted an offset equal to the
going wage for law professors. In the sale of labor, the "market" is very
narrow and the question is what this particular professor could have
earned.
Finally, the traditional rule is consistent with the remedial policy of
not permitting the nonbreaching party to retain gains made possible by
the breach. 0 With limited exceptions,41 income earned by the wrongfully
' Id. at 182, 474 P.2d at 693, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
Id at 186-87, 474 P.2d at 696, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
For the variety of ways in which the duty has been expressed, see id. at 186, 474 P.2d
at 695, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94; Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748, 757, 239 P. 373, 376
(1925); Annot., 28 A.L.R. 736 (1924).
3, See notes 90-92 & accompanying text infra.
a C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 160, at 629.
See U.C.C. § 2-708.
D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.25, at 924-25.
According to Professor Dobbs, the distinction is between a "theoretical" market value
and the actual ability to obtain a job. Id- at 925. In fact, the distinction is probably based on
how narrowly the market is defined. In the case of employment, unlike fungible goods, the
market is individual-specific.
39 See, e.g., San Antonio Light Publishing Co. v. Moore, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 262, 101
S.W. 867, 870 (1907).
40 See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1095, at 517 (1964); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336,
comment c (1932). There is a question as to whether the gains are actually made possible by
the breach. See text accompanying notes 94-164 infra.
4' As noted earlier, see note 6 supra, the employer is typically not credited with income
that the plaintiff could have earned while employed by the defendant.
[Vol. 56:207
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discharged worker, even in nonsubstitute positions, is credited to the
breaching party. A different policy would have a punitive effect in that
the breaching party would be liable for damages in excess of the plain-
tiff's actual losses. Adherence to the remedial goal in this context
reduces the discharged worker's incentive to search for nonsubstitute
employment and may result in suboptimal leisure.
Economic Analysis
The Leisure Windfall
The common law rule is designed to encourage minimization and to
protect the employee's benefit of the bargain. The rule also seems to
limit the employee's recovery to actual damages. Figure I illustrates the
proposition. Suppose at the beginning of a month the worker and the
employer enter into an employment contract for a certain number of
days of work at a particular wage. The X axis in the figure is presented
in terms of days per month. The Y axis is in terms of absolute utility
Curve U shows the amount of utility or pleasure derived from the in-
come earned by an additional day of work. Curve D plots the disutility
associated with an additional day of work."2 U is downward sloping, in-
Absolute FIGURE I
Utility
B
A"
0 Q Days per
Month
Similarly, in some instances courts have not allowed full credit when it is determined
that the new position is more rigorous. See, e.g., Williams v. Chicago Coal Co., 60 Ill. 149
(1871); Evesson v. Ziegfeld, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 79 (1903).
" The nonmonetary utility associated with the position could be represented by raising
U or by lowering D. For simplicity, it may be assumed that U is exclusively monetary
income-related and that psychic income has been netted out in deriving D.
1981]
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dicating that the individual receives less income per day as the number
of days increases and that, as he has more income, the additional
pleasure derived from the additional income decreases." Conversely, the
disutility associated with an extra day of work increases as the worker
has less leisure time available. In effect, the curves show the costs and
benefits associated with a particular position.
The individual will choose to work those days on which the extra utility
derived from the income earned exceeds the disutility associated with the
work. In the figure, he would choose to contract for Q days in the month.
Beyond Q days the additional disutility begins to exceed the utility. The
area ABC shows the total amount by which the utility derived from the in-
come earned by working Q days exceeds the total amount of disutility.
This area represents, in effect, the benefit of the bargain to the employee,
or his utility expectancy.
The common law rule protects the benefit of the bargain in that the
discharged employee is expected to minimize damages only by accept-
ing substantially similar employment. In the figure, this would be
employment with basically the same disutility as the original position.
Of course, if no jobs are available of this character, the individual may
remain idle. One problem should be obvious: the common law rule that
the discharged worker is not permitted to keep income earned in
substitute or nonsubstitute employment flows from the premise that
contract remedies should be designed so that the nonbreaching party
does not retain gains made possible by the breach. The rule, however,
does exactly what it is designed to prevent. Before the breach, the utili-
ty surplus is equal to ABC. After the breach, if there are no substitutes,
the utility surplus expands to OBCQ. Thus, while the common law does
not allow retention of income earned in nonsubstitute employment, it
does permit retention of what is essentially a leisure windfall.
The Bargaining Solution
The decision that a discharge has been wrongful amounts, in effect, to
a determination that the employee has a "right," if there are no
substitutes available, to remain idle. The actual value of this right to the
employee is somewhat limited in that he may not keep the income a new
employer would pay him for not exercising it. The discharging party
also gains nothing from his right to income earned because the worker
is unlikely to accept nonsubstitute employment.
The situation is one in which the parties are in a bilateral monopoly
" Even if there is no decrease in wages per day, as the number of days increases the
curve will retain its basic shape as long as income is subject to diminishing marginal utility.
If the curves have different shapes the analysis will remain the same.
[Vol. 56:207
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relationship with respect to the prospective idleness rights." The
employee possesses monopoly power over these rights and the discharg-
ing employer has monopsony power. The parties would be expected to
determine a "price" amounting to the portion of income obtainable from
nonsubstitute employment which the discharged worker would be per-
mitted to retain. In a situation in which outside employment is par-
ticularly distasteful, the price to the discharging party of the discharged
party's right not to expand his minimization efforts may be extremely
high or even prohibitive. Still, if the discharging party is able to retain any
of the normally worthless right to income earned, he would be benefited
and should be willing to bargain.
Ideally, then, the discharged worker would compare outside employ-
ment with the portion of the income obtainable which the discharging
party would allow him to retain. The effect would be to encourage the
discharged worker to re-enter the labor market. One could argue, there-
fore, that the common law rule is not as inefficient as it originally
appears; or, if it is inefficient, it is an inefficiency around which the par-
ties would be willing to negotiate.
While the bilateral monopoly model has appeal, it is probably unrealis-
tic to expect it to work effectively.45 First, by the time the parties have
litigated the issue of whether the discharge was wrongful and, therefore,
the assignment of idleness rights, a substantial period of suboptimal
leisure may have already passed. Second, the willingness to negotiate
will be a function of the parties' attitudes toward risk and how strongly
they feel about the merits of the discharge. Under the present rule, once
the wrongfulness of the discharge has been established and the
damages determined, the possibility of negotiating around the ineffi-
ciency will be eliminated. Continued litigation in this area indicates that
parties are frequently willing to push the issue as far as possible.
Since it is unlikely that the inefficiency in the traditional remedial
scheme is eliminated through a bilateral monopoly transaction, it is
worthwhile to consider alternative methods of bringing wrongfully dis-
charged workers back into the labor market. The three strategies
presented are evaluated as to their effectiveness, their retention of com-
mon law fairness vis A vis the nonbreaching party's benefit of the
bargain and their impact on the decision to breach.
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO MINIMIZE
Expanding the scope of the duty to minimize results in the discharged
" See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFOR-
MANCE 242-45 (1970).
" The availability of severance pay in some instances and decisions to settle rather than
go to trial in others indicate that the problem is amenable to negotiation. See generally R.
POSNER, supra note 7, at 434-41.
1981]
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worker's being charged with the income he could have earned by accept-
ing positions different from and, perhaps, inferior to those originally
held. Deciding whether to return to the labor force differs from the
usual work/leisure decision in that the worker is attempting to preserve
his original income level, rather than to increase it. Despite this dif-
ference, the determinants of whether an individual will return to work
should remain the same. An expanded duty rule has been applied in
Texas46 and in back pay actions stemming from discharges in violation of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)4 7 An examination of these
rules in practice is a useful preface to an analysis of this alternative.
The "Texas Rule"
In Texas, the wrongfully discharged worker is permitted to search for
a substantially similar position for a reasonable time. After this, the
duty to minimize extends to other employment for which he is "fitted."4
The extent to which results under the Texas rule differ from those
under the typical common law rule is not clear.49 For example, in Buffalo
Bayou v. Lorentz,- the plaintiff was employed as a tugboat captain on a
month-to-month basis at a salary of $100 per month. At mid-month he
was discharged and offered an inferior position at a salary of $90 per
" See notes 48-62 & accompanying text infra.
"7 Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), makes
it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise" of their § 7 rights (the employees' basic rights to organize and bargain col-
lectively) which the Act seeks to protect, id. § 157. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, id. § 158(a)(3),
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." Thus, the firing of an employee for union activity
amounts to a violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 504 U.S.
333 (1938). The refusal to hire persons because of their affiliation with a particular labor
union constitutes a violation of § 8(a)(3). Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
Section 10 of the Act gives the National Labor Relations Board various powers for prevent-
ing and remedying unfair labor practices. Section 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), empowers
the Board "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without backpay, as will effectuate the policies of this act." This language is consistently in-
terpreted to give the Board the power to award backpay to employees who have been fired
or refused employment due to their union activity. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177 (1941).
" See Simon v. Allen, 76 Tex. 398, 13 S.W. 296 (1890).
" There seems to be some question as to whether the Texas courts are continuing to ap-
ply this rule. Although not expressly overruling it, the courts have recently phrased the
rule as requiring the discharged worker to make a reasonable effort to seek and accept
other employment. Compare Simon v. Allen, 76 Tex. 398, 13 S.W. 296 (1890), and Wolf Cigar
Stores Co. v. Kramer, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 411, 418, 109 S.W. 990, 994 (1908), with Cole v. City
of Houston, 442 S.W.2d 445, 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), and Mr. Eddie, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 430
S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), and A.J. Foyt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jacobs, 578 S.W.2d 445,
447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
1 177 S.W. 1183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
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month, which he refused. The trial court awarded the plaintiff
$100-the expected salary for the contract period of one month. 1 On ap-
peal, the employer argued that the plaintiff had failed to minimize
because he had not taken the employment offered when he was dis-
charged. The appellate court affirmed, indicating that the "law does not
contemplate that when a contract is broken the aggrieved party shall
humiliate himself at once by accepting a lower grade of employment. 52
The court noted that after a reasonable time, the plaintiff would have
been charged with income that could have been earned in an inferior
position, although perhaps not that offered by the discharging
employer, but that here a reasonable time had not passed.' In this and
other Texas cases,54 the "reasonable time" factor has produced results
consistent with those reached under the typical common law rule.
The Texas rule has also been interpreted as retaining elements of the
majority rule. One case 5 involved a railroad worker who was discharged
from his position in Houston and offered a similar, but inferior, position
in San Antonio or Kennedy. The trial court found that the plaintiff was
unable to find "similar or other employment" and entered judgment for
the full amount of lost wages." The defendant appealed, arguing that
the plaintiff had failed to minimize by refusing the positions offered.57
The Commission of Appeals announced that the Texas rule allows the
discharged worker to look for a similar position for a reasonable time,
after which he will be charged with income obtainable in "other employ-
ment for which he [was] fitted."58 It affirmed the lower court, however,
indicating that the plaintiff had attempted to secure other employment
in Houston, and was not obligated to "seek or accept employment
elsewhere in a distant locality."'5 9
The Texas rule has not always been applied in such a way that the
results are consistent with those produced by the traditional rule. In
Wolf Cigar Stores Co. v. Kramer,6" the plaintiff contracted for a one
year term of employment as general manager of the defendant's cigar
store at a salary of $250 per month." After five months, the plaintiff was
reassigned to manage a hotel cigar stand. He regarded this as a demo-
s, Id. at 1183.
' Id at 1185.
5 Id.
" See, e.g., Simon v. Allen, 79 Tex. 398, 13 S.W. 296 (1890); Mr. Eddie, Inc. v. Ginsberg,
430 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Copeland v. Hill, 126 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
15 San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Collins, 61 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
"Id. at 89.
Id at 87.
"Id at 89.
" Id
, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 411, 109 S.W. 990 (1908).
S Id. at 413, 109 S.W. at 992.
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tion and elected to treat it as a breach of the employment contract and a
wrongful discharge. Two months later the plaintiff opened his own
business which operated at a loss for the remainder of the contract
period. At trial, the plaintiff testified that he could have taken a position
as a bookkeeper at $75 per month.2 The court of appeals approved an
award of the full contract wage minus the greater of what he could have
earned as a bookkeeper or his value in his own business." Under the
common law rule, the amount the plaintiff could have earned as a book-
keeper would have been irrelevant; the defendant would have been
credited with the income from the bookkeeping position only if the
plaintiff had actually accepted that position.
NLRA Backpay Claims
A broader duty to minimize damages has also been sporadically ap-
plied in cases involving backpay awards arising under the NLRA." Ap-
plications of this broader duty seem to derive from Phelps Dodge v.
NLRB,"5 in which the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether the amounts wrongfully discharged individuals could have
earned would be allowed as an offset in calculating the backpay award.6
The Court ruled that losses "willfully incurred" by discharged workers
should be deducted from the award,67 but did not specify whether the
concept of willfully incurred losses involved a duty to minimize com-
parable to that under the common law rule. It did, however, indicate
that it had a greater interest in "promoting production and employ-
ment" than in the "minimization of damages"6 and that the Board
should "give appropriate weight to a clearly unjustifiable refusal to take
desirable new employment."69
Regardless of the scope of the duty envisioned by the Court, some
lower courts have held that deductions from backpay awards are to be
made for income that could have been earned in positions other than the
common law reasonable substitute. In NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co.,7"
62 Id. at 414, 109 S.W. at 992.
Id. at 418, 109 S.W. at 994.
64 See, e.g., NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NLRB v.
Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 242 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957); NLRB v.
Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1955). Although this development seems to be
independent of the Texas rule, at least one Texas decision, Simon v. Allen, 76 Tex. 398, 13
S.W. 296 (1890), has been cited in the context of an NLRA backpay award. See NLRB v.
Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d at 705.
' 313 U.S. 177 (1941),followed in NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 F.2d 391, 397 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 242 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 821 (1957).
313 U.S. at 200.
6? Id. at 198.
Id. at 200.
69 Id. at 199-200.
o 224 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1955).
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the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a wrongfully dis-
charged mill worker was obligated to seek and accept other suitable
employment;71 the court indicated that "suitable employment" for a
healthy man living in an agricultural community and having experience
in agricultural jobs included agricultural employment." Likewise, in
NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc.,73 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit cited Phelps74 and applied what has been labeled the "lower
sights doctrine."75 The court ruled that reasonable efforts to "secure
'substantially equivalent' ,,7' employment may not be sufficient min-
imization.7 7 Thus, losses that could be avoided by lowering one's sights
as to acceptable employment could be regarded as "willfully incurred. 78
More recently, in NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc.,79 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied a slightly different
version of the broader duty to minimize. In Madison Courier, it was held
that wrongfully discharged skilled workers in the printing trade were
expected to minimize damages by accepting employment outside their
usual line of work. The court noted that common law rules were not
"directly applicable" to the statutory area;8' it claimed, however, not to
be applying the lower sights doctrine.82 Instead, this court seemed to
employ a "different but equal" standard to objectively categorize the
positions available to discharged workers according to their danger,
distastefulness and uncongeniality.83 Failure to accept employment
similar in terms of these characteristics, even though in different
trades, was held to be inconsistent with a reasonable effort to minimize
damages.'
It would be incorrect to say that the broader duty to minimize has
received widespread support in the context of the NLRA; the circuits
are in significant disagreement as to the appropriate minimization
rule. 5 In addition, the Board has consistently resisted applying any rule
that imposes more than the common law duty to minimize.86
"1 Id. at 705-06.
72 Id.
7' 242 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957).
" Id. at 700.
,- Id.; see NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 F.2d 391, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
," 242 F.2d at 700.
" Id.
' Id.
7" 505 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
'o Id. at 402-03.
81 Id. at 398.
12 Id. at 396.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 402.
Compare NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), with NLRB v.
Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 493 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974), and
Lozano Enterprises, 152 N.L.R.B. 258 (1965).
Madison Courier is an example of the struggle between the Board and the circuit
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Analysis
Although an argument can be made that the expanded duty to
minimize in the context of the NLRA, or other legislatively created claims
for backpay, may undercut the effectiveness of the legislation,"' there
seems to be little doubt that the expanded duty to minimize would
lower the probability that the worker will remain idle. Even in the con-
text of the goal of bringing the discharged worker back into the labor
force, however, this strategy is beset by severe practical, as well as con-
ceptual, problems.
From a practical standpoint, determining the obligations of the
wrongfully discharged worker to minimize is difficult enough under the
common law rule. The broader duty places the nonbreaching party in an
even riskier position: If reasonable substitute employment is not
available, how long may the individual search before his sights must be
lowered or changed? How far from the original employment must one
search? Once the worker has accepted nonsubstitute employment, must
he continue to search for employment that would be a reasonable
substitute or that would be higher paying? The latter problem arose in
Madison Courier; two wQrkers had accepted part time jobs outside their
area of skill.88 The court described the dilemma of the discharged
worker:
If he accepts the lower-paying job too soon, he may be held to have
incurred a willfull loss of earnings by accepting an unsuitable posi-
tion. But if he turns down the lower-paying job, he may be held to
have incurred a willful loss of earnings by failing to "lower his
sights." 19
Clearly, the nonbreaching or nonviolating party should not be forced to
bear this increased risk. The court in Madison Courier concluded that,
while there were still limitations on how long one could keep a lower-
paying position when better jobs were available, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the discharged worker.90 Although this is a sensible
way to deal with the problem, the discharged worker still seems to be in
the difficult to justify position of bearing additional risks thrust upon
him by the breaching or violating party.
One bothersome conceptual problem in the context of employment
contracts is that the expanded scope may not be consistent with the in-
terests that are generally protected by contract remedies. The common
courts of appeals on this issue. 505 F.2d at 394; see American Med. Ins. Co., 235 N.L.R.B.
1417 (1978); F.M. Broadcasting Corp., 233 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977).
1, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 889, 896-97 (1975).
505 F.2d at 405-06.
Id. at 405.
90Id-
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law rule protects the employee's benefit of the bargain by limiting the
scope of the duty to minimize. Figure II illustrates how this would be
altered under a strict application of the Texas rule." D1 shows the
disutility associated with the original position and D 2 the disutility
associated with a less desirable alternative. U1 remains the same even if
the alternative is lower-paying, since the breaching party would be
liable for the difference between the income earned in the new position
and the income in the old position. In the figure, the new utility-
maximizing level of employment would shift from Q, to Q). The total
utility surplus would be EBF. The worker would lose the utility
associated with the days Q2 through Q1 .92 In addition, AEFG is part of
the original benefit of the bargain which would no longer accrue to the
individual. The fact that he would have income or utility equal to what
could have been earned for Q2 days of work in the old position is irrele-
vant. In fact, he would have paid a higher price by incurring more dis-
utility in order to earn this amount, and the surplus would be decreased.
Thus, the common law rule protects the benefit of the bargain at the
risk of creating a leisure windfall for the nonbreaching party. The Texas
rule, on the other hand, subordinates the discharged worker's interest
FIGURE II
Absolute
Utility
B
E Ia
! IA
0 Q2 Q, Days per
Month
" A strict application would require the discharged worker to lower his sights continual-
ly until he found employment.
" Even though the individual receives income per unit of time equal to that in the
original employment, he maximizes utility by working less in the new higher disutility posi-
tion than he did in the original position.
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in the benefit of the bargain to the goal of decreasing idleness. Of
course, even under the Texas rule, the worker is permitted to retain the
benefit of the bargain for a reasonable time.
Statutory actions for backpay do not fit easily into the contract model
since their purpose is to discourage discharge but not necessarily to pro-
tect the utility expectancy of the employee." Policies similar to those in-
volved in the NLRA could, however, be applied in the area of employ-
ment contracts. The "lower sights doctrine" would operate in the same
manner as the Texas rule. The Madison Courier "different but equal"
rule would be slightly different. In dealing with an employment con-
tract, the procedure would require objectifying a position with respect
to several crucial variables. The employee would be expected to accept
different employment so long as it was found to be essentially similar to
the previous employment based on the selected characteristics. The
Madison Courier approach attempts to find positions that have the same
disutility associated with them as the original job. It permits much less
subjective job evaluation than the common law rule, but seems to go
further than the Texas rule in protecting the benefit of the bargain.
THE HUMAN CAPITAL APPROACH
The human capital approach to the problem of suboptimal leisure is
quite different from that involved in expanding the scope of the duty to
minimize. Rather than threaten the wrongfully discharged worker with
a loss of income, the human capital approach relies on the opportunity
for additional income to motivate the worker to re-enter the labor
market. 4 The following materials introduce the concept and explain the
rationale for treating the discharged seller of labor in a fashion similar
to the treatment of the seller of goods.
The Concept of Human Capital
Economists traditionally list three factors of production: land, labor
and capital. Capital is the label used to identify those goods that are in-
puts as well as outputs of productive processes. Labor and land, on the
other hand, are natural inputs that are not products of economic activi-
ty. In reality, the productive potential of human beings cannot be
regarded as labor in its purest sense. Most, if not all, human productive
' See note 47 supra.
9' The employee would be permitted to retain a portion of the income obtained in non-
substitute positions.
9s For an application of the concept of human capital in a different context, see Kay &
Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 937, 964 (1977).
See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 15 (11th ed. 1980).
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effort is made possible by both inherited attributes and by the skills and
knowledge acquired within the economic system. This mixed factor of
production is referred to as human capital. 7
Human capital is not a new concept to economists, but it has recently
generated a great deal of interest. 8 This interest was stimulated by a
desire to explain increases in economic growth that were not accounted
for by traditional input analysis.9 For example, while income increased
at a rate of 3.1/ per year during the period from 1919 through 1957,
physical capital increased at a rate of only 1.8% per year."' Likewise, it
has been estimated that only one-fourth of the increase in output in the
United States in the period from 1869 through 1953 was due to the con-
ventional factors of production."1 Economists began to hypothesize that
the divergence was a function of an increase in the quality of human in-
puts. ' A leading authority in this area explains the proposition as one
in which "[t]he observed growth in productivity per unit of labor is simp-
ly a consequence of holding the unit of labor constant over time
although in fact this unit of labor has been increasing as a result of a
steadily growing amount of human capital per worker."'03
The emphasis on human capital has intensified research efforts design-
ed to calculate rates of returns for various forms of human capital invest-
ment.10' The methodology employed is similar to that used in calculating
the rate of returns to investments in physical capital."5 Studies indicate
See T. SCHULTZ, INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 48 (1971); L. THUROW, INVESTMENT IN
HUMAN CAPITAL 1-2 (1970). Any activity that increases or preserves the productivity of
humans can be regarded as adding to the development of human capital. The most obvious
example is education. This would include not simply higher education but elementary
education and on-the-job training. In addition, health care, accident prevention and even
migration are forms of developing and investing in human capital. T. SCHULTZ, supra, at 36.
" The earliest human capital studies seem to have been conducted in the mid-seventeenth
century. See Kiker, Human Capital in Retrospect, in 16 ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS 1-5 (June
1968). Generally, however, mixing of the concepts of capital and labor was resisted or
neglected. There are several reasons for this: first, tradition has dictated that land, labor
and capital be separately considered; second, economists have generally included as capital
only things that were marketable; finally, human capital has been considered difficult to
measure. Kiker, The Concept of Human Capital, in 14 ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS 1-3 (Nov. 1966).
See also Schultz, Investment in Manw An Economist's View, 33 Soc. SERv. REV. 109, 109-12
(1959).
Kiker, The Concept of Human Capital, in 14 ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS 4-6 (Nov. 1966).M® Schultz, supra note 98, at 114.
03 Abramovitz, Resources and Output Trends in the United States Since 1870, 46 AM.
ECON. REV., May, 1956, at 5, 12-13.
102 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 98, at 114.
103 T. SCHULTZ, supra note 97, at 33.
10, See, e.g., Becker, Underinvestment in College Education?, 50 AM. ECON. REV., May,
1960, at 346; Carnoy & Marenbach, The Return to Schooling in the United States, 10 J.
HUMAN RESOURCES 312 (1975); Cropper, Health, Investment in Health and Occupational
Choice, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1273 (1977); Raymond & Sesnowitz, The Returns to Investments in
Higher Education: Some New Evidence, 10 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 139 (1975).
" See, e.g., Hines, Tweeten & Redfern, Social and Private Rates of Return to Invest-
ment in Schooling, by Race-Sex Groups and Regions, 5 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 318 (1970).
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that the return may vary with race,"' sex107 and region.0 8 The returns also
vary with the. nature of the investment. 9 Using rate of return data,
economists supply the information from which judgments can be made
concerning the issues of over-investment or under-investment in par-
ticular areas " and the amount of public investment in human capital.1 '
Sellers of Labor as Capitalists
Critical to the case for treating sellers of labor as capitalists is the
question of whether sellers of labor behave as capitalists: Are in-
vestments in human capital a response to expected returns to the in-
vestment? Examinations of investments in migration" and education1
indicate that sellers of labor do exhibit capitalist-like behavior.
In migration, the cost of relocating and the income foregone during
the move represent the primary pecuniary components of the invest-
ment. The pecuniary returns from the investment are represented by
the additional income which will be earned in the new location., One of
the major determinants of migration is the opportunity for increased in-
come;"' economists have linked both interstate"' and international
1 1 7
flows of human capital to income differentials. Studies show that an
investment-like analysis is involved in the decision to migrate." 8
Most human capital research has. focused on investments in
education. "9 Investors display the expected tendencies in this area as
,08 Id. at 325.
.l at 330.
... Id. at 336-37.
109 See, e.g., Ashenfelter & Mooney, Some Evidence on the Private Returns to Graduate
Education, 35 S. ECON. J. 247 (1969).
.. See, e.g., Freeman, Overinvestment in College Training?, 10 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 287
(1975).
..! See, e.g., Hines, Tweeten & Redfern, supra note 105.
11 See, e.g., Grubel & Scott, The Immigration of Scientists and Engineers to the United
States, 1949-61, 74 J. POL. ECON. 368 (1966); Sjaastad, The Costs and Returns of Human
Migration, 70 J. POL. ECON. 80 (Oct. Supp. 1962).
' See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 110.
11 See Sjaastad, supra note 112, at 83-91.
,5 Id. at 82. See also Borts, The Equalization of Returns and Regional Economic Growth,
50 AM. ECON. REV., May, 1960, at 319.
1.6 See, e.g., Sjaastad, supra note 112, at 80 n.2.
11 See, e.g., id. See also Grubel & Scott, supra note 112.
18 The proposition may be further illustrated in the context of a continuing legal and
economic problem: one of the costs of illegal migration is the penalty associated with being
discovered multiplied by the probability of discovery. One can make a strong argument that
one of the reasons that so many are willing to make the investment, despite this cost, is
that the cost is simply too low. The decision is, simply, that the returns warrant the invest-
ment.
119 See, e.g., Brown, A Model of Optimal Human-Capital Accumulation and the Wages of
Young High School Graduates, 84 J. POL. ECON. 299 (1976); Campbell & Curtis, Graduate
Education and Private Rates of Return A Review of Theory and Empiricising, 13 ECON.
INQUIRY 99 (1975); Freeman, supra note 110; Raymond & Sesnowitz, supra note 104.
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well. For example, while the actual rate of return varies from study to
study, 2 ' it does appear that the returns to higher education were fairly
stable until 1970.2" In the 1970's, however, there was a marked decline
in the rates of return to higher education,'" apparently because job op-
portunities in professional and managerial positions began to increase at
a slower pace than previously.'" One study indicates that the rate of
return fell from 11% in 1959 to 8.5/o in 1974. '24 The investment compo-
nent of higher education'" was not as attractive as it had once been, and
the result was a significant decline in college enrollments.'26
The figures show that investors in human capital respond in the same
fashion as do investors in physical capital. Human capital analysis is par-
ticularly difficult because, unlike physical capital, some of the returns to
investments in human capital are nonpecuniary. If these nonpecuniary
returns could be included in the investment analysis, the argument that
sellers of labor exhibit capitalist-like behavior would certainly be more
compelling.
The Human Capital/Physical Capital Analogy
The Seller of Goods
The problem of waste considered here normally does not arise in the
sale of goods. It seems clear that, under the Uniform Commercial Code,
a seller will not profit by remaining idle.'" The physical capitalist is,
unlike his human capital counterpart, able to retain the benefits of non-
substitute performance. Thus, one method of avoiding the waste in-
herent in the common law wrongful discharge remedy is to treat the
human capitalist, as far as is possible, the same as the physical capitalist
seller of goods.
The Code analogue for the wrongfully discharged worker is the seller
of unfinished goods."2 8 Under section 2-704(2), the seller, in the exercise
Campbell & Curtis, supra note 119, at 101.
' Carnoy & Marenbach, supra note 104, at 316, 318, 322.
'" Freeman, supra note 110, at 296-97.
,, Id at 291.
12 Id at 296.
Higher education is also used for present consumption.
' For example, in 1968, 44% of male civilians enrolled in college. By contrast, in 1974,
the percentage entering college from the same age group fell to 35/o. Freeman, supra note
110, at 298. Enrollments fell from 1.4 million to 1.3 million during this period while there
was a 25% increase in the number of 18-19 year old males. Id
See notes 128-36 & accompanying text infra.
,' See U.C.C. § 2-704(2). There may be a question as to whether the wrongfully discharg-
ed human capitalist is in the position of selling finished or unfinished goods. One could
argue that the wrongfully discharged employee holds an inventory of productive capacity
which he has been prevented from delivering; the finished goods were available but not
called for. On the other hand, one could identify the human capital goods as a composite of
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of reasonable judgment, must decide whether to stop manufacture or to
complete the goods. If he stops, he is entitled to be placed in the posi-
tion he would have been in had there been no breach. Actual damages
would then be equal to the price less the expenses saved and the resale
value of the materials or the partially completed goods. This leaves the
seller in the net position of having received lost profits including
overhead.129 The recovery would not be reduced if the seller elected to
use the same capital goods to produce other goods.'30
On the other hand, the seller may complete the goods, identify them
to the contract and resell them under section 2-706.'' Damages would
equal "the difference between the resale price and the contract price
together with any incidental damages .... but less expenses saved in
consequence of the buyer's breach."'32 If the goods cannot be resold, the
seller may proceed in an action for the price under section 2-709.'" In
the case of manufactured goods, the seller has the additional option of
proceeding under section 2-708 for the difference between the contract
and market price or for lost profit. 3 ' Comment 2 to section 2-704 states
that the seller need not make what appears to have been, with the
benefit of hindsight, the best decision with regard to completion of the
goods.3 ' Moreover, the burden is on the buyer to show that the plaintiff/
seller's decision was commercially unreasonable.'3 6
It is clear in this remedial scheme that the seller is encouraged to
make use of available productive capacity. If there are sales oppor-
tunities in which revenues exceed the costs of production, the seller
may keep the excess and there is no disincentive to produce. There ap-
pear to be no circumstances under which the seller is better off passing
up opportunities. The decision on any additional activity is independent
of the previous breach.
The rationale for this scheme seems to flow from the common law and
is due to two characteristics of sellers of manufactured goods. First, the
additional production is not made possible by the breach. The seller of
human capital plus effort, so that when the seller is discharged, the goods are unfinished.
While the matter is debatable, it does not affect the following analysis.
" See generally R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 179 (1970).
'M In effect, the seller may opt for a U.C.C. § 2-708 recovery under which he recovers lost
profit as a lost volume seller. See generally Childres & Burgess, Seller's Remedies: The
Primary Use of U. C. C. 2-708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 833 (1973).
3, U.C.C. § 2-706. See generally Nordstrom, Seller's Damages Following Resale Under
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1299 (1967).
U.C.C. § 2-706.
' Id. § 2-709; see Bradford Novelty Co. v. Technomatic, Inc., 142 Conn. 166, 112 A.2d 214
(1955), cited in R. NORDSTROM, supra note 129, § 179, at 549 n.75.
'M, The seller may complete the goods but elect not to treat their sale as a § 2-706 resale.
See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 129, § 179, at 549.
' U.C.C. § 2-704, Comment 2.
'134 1& -
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manufactured goods is assumed to be capable of finishing the goods con-
tracted for and producing additional goods. The Code merely reflects
the common law view that "manufacturing facilities can usually be ex-
panded to meet all demands; therefore, profit made of the manufacture
and sale of a second article is not deducted." 3 '
A second consideration is that the seller is not required to suffer any
"undue risk, expense, or humiliation""'3 in the effort to minimize
damages. Part of the compensation to any seller of goods is that
associated with risk taking. Profits resulting from the use of physical
capital to produce the same type of goods or goods different from those
originally called for can be attributed to the assumption of additional
risks. The seller is not expecteA to take additional risks on behalf of the
defendant and, therefore, the benefits of these risks are retained by the
seller.139
The Seller of Labor
Can the logic of the Code accomodate the seller of outputs of human
capital? The answer, in short, is that even the human capital approach
does not permit precise Code-like treatment. It does seem clear,
however, that the seller of goods and the seller of labor'40 are far more
similar than they initially appear to be. This is borne out by an examina-
tion of the human capitalist in terms of the logic of the Code.
Suppose that A is employed by B on a two year contract as an
engineer specializing in aircraft design. Due to a general downturn in
the market for aircraft, A is discharged. A searches diligently and finds
that there are no jobs that are reasonable substitutes. At this point A
may stop his search and collect the full contract rate from B, or he may
seek additional employment. Suppose A does find a job making ice
cream sundaes at a local ice cream parlor. Under the common law, if the
two jobs are mutually exclusive, any income earned by A would be used
to offset A's claim against B. Is A's position so different from the seller
of goods in terms of risk and lost volume that the treatment afforded
this additional income should be different?
With respect to risk, Professor Corbin has observed that "[t]he
discharged worker can reasonably be expected to take another job for
wages or salary since the gain therefrom is practically certain, and the
137 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 40, § 1041, at 258 (footnotes omitted).
13 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336(1) (1932).
Id., comment c. The seller is, in effect, a lost volume seller and is, therefore, permitted
to recover the lost profit associated with the buyer's breach and retain earnings associated
with the new sale. See Grinnell Co. v. Voorhees, 1 F.2d 693, 695 (3d Cir. 1924).
"I One may also view the human capitalist as renting, as opposed to selling, his efforts,
as the capital itself does not change ownership. See A. REES, supra note 10, at 35.
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risk of loss negligible. 141 Although Professor Corbin's conclusions as to
the risks borne by the seller of labor are correct, this is an issue
separate from that of whether any risks actually exist. In the example,
A already possesses the human capital necessary for designing aircraft.
Now, additional human capital must be acquired. Time and money spent
searching for the new position are significant investments. A may be
forced to relocate or travel greater distances to and from work. If he
receives on-the-job training, his investment may be in the form of lower
income during the initial period of employment. All of this will be
wasted if the new position is terminated or if a reasonable substitute
position becomes available.
Thus, A's new employment venture is fraught with risk. As long as
these risks and expenses are associated with reasonable mitigation ef-
forts, they are borne by the wrongfully discharging employer."'
Although it makes sense not to permit A to keep income from the
development of human capital that the discharging party has, in effect,
paid for, the net result is that very little investment will occur. The
seller of goods may take risks, but when he does, the benefit of this risk
taking accrues to him, as do the losses if the investment is a bad one.
The seller of labor, on the other hand, determines whether risks are to
be taken, but does not stand to lose or gain from this decision as long as
it is reasonable.
In short, as far as investment risks are concerned, sellers of labor and
sellers of goods are treated differently. It would seem logical, though, to
treat them similarly. In the absence of substitutes, the employee would
be on his own in deciding whether to take risks. A should be allowed to
keep income from the risks associated with the development of new
human capital and should not be shielded if the investment decision
results in a loss.
The more difficult problem in the analogy is the lost volume issue. As
long as the positions are mutually exclusive, one may argue that the
employer should be credited with gains made possible by the breach. This
argument, though, ignores the human capital aspect of the transaction.
While the breach has made the new position possible, it is not sufficient
in and of itself. The other critical element in the proposition, if the
employee is the risk taker, is the willingness of the seller to make the
additional investment."' One may view the output of the seller of labor
1,! 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 40, § 1041, at 261.
4 See, e.g., Rench v. Hayes Equip. Mfg. Co., 134 Kan. 865, 8 P.2d 346 (1932). See general-
ly Annot., 84 A.L.R. 171 (1933).
4I The case for allowing A to retain all earnings obtained from nonsubstitute employ-
ment would be that if he were unable to find a position designing aircraft, the market value
of his services would have fallen to zero. He would be entitled to the contract/market dif-
ferential which would equal the contract salary. If he takes a position as a sundae maker, he
is not involved in a resale as he is selling an entirely different type of human capital.
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as a result of both a human capital element and a pure effort element."'
When the contract is breached, both become available. If the discharged
employee is able to find a position that is a reasonable substitute, both
the human capital and pure effort elements are used and the breaching
party is entitled to full credit. In any other case, only the pure effort ele-
ment is resold as a result of the breach and only a portion of the new
compensation should accrue to the defendant. The human capital ele-
ment of the new position involves a new investment decision, the
returns of which should remain with the discharged worker who, ideal-
ly, would be incurring the new risk.'
45
The policy of not allowing a breaching party to profit from the breach
offers limited support for the human capital approach. For example, if
the seller of goods is able to resell at a price in excess of the contract
price, the breaching party is not entitled to the excess.'4 6 The higher
price may be, in effect, a reward for the seller's negotiation skills. Using
the human capital view and following the same line of reasoning, the
breaching employer should only be credited with the amount earned in
the resale of what was made available as a result of the breach. If the
employee is in a new occupation using different human capital in which
he has invested, the breaching party should only be entitled to the com-
pensation for the pure effort factor. To allow a full credit is tantamount
to allowing the employer to benefit from the extra efforts of the plain-
tiff.147
Finally, the human capital issue is very similar to the situation in
which the discharged worker, rather than seeking employment in a
similar job, enters into business for himself. Generally, the position of
the courts has been that any income earned is subtracted from the lost
"I This distinction has been made in A. REES, supra note 10, at 19-53. For this analysis, it
may be more accurate to view the new position as involving three elements. The pure effort
portion would be the worker's willingness to forego leisure. New human capital would in-
volve the acquisition of new skills, changes in location and so on. Finally, some existing
human capital will be used in the new position. This human capital can be included in one of
the two other categories. To the extent it is used in work or leisure in an unadapted form, it can
be reflected as "effort." If it must be adapted, then it can be included as new investment.
Thus, the label "effort" refers to both unchanged human capital and leisure foregone.
"I Of course, since the worker would be expected to pay the expense of new human
capital and permitted to retain the returns if the investment were unprofitable, this should
not affect the former employer's right to the effort income.
Another objection to allowing the discharged worker to keep the earnings would be that
he is involved in a resale of scrap. Indeed, U.C.C. § 2-704(2) allows the seller to cease
manufacture and "resell for scrap or salvage value." Again, the human capital element of
the transaction is ignored. If there is an occupation which requires no more than pure ef-
fort, the "scrap" argument would hold. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a posi-
tion that does not require learning, practice and the acquisition of skills.
,, See id. § 2-706(6).
" Of course, as long as the employer is liable for the expenses associated with these ef-
forts, it is logical to allow him to retain the benefits.
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wages. " 8 This view, in effect, credits the employer with the risk taking
of the employee, which is independent of the breach. Professor Corbin
has argued that gains associated with this use of capital should accrue
to the investor and not to the breaching employer. "9 This suggestion
has a great deal of merit in terms of economic analysis and is consistent
with a human capital approach to wrongful discharge.
The Human Capital Approach in Practice
The human capital approach is severely limited in its ability to
eliminate suboptimal leisure. No matter how much income the worker
can obtain, the "effort" portion is credited to the breaching employer.
Thus, while there is some motivation to return to work, the decision
concerning re-entry into the labor force is clouded by the fact of the
previous breach. Unlike situations involving the seller of manufactured
goods, the new employment venture is not independent of the previous
one. The amount credited to the former employer is, in effect, a tax on
additional income and would have similar disincentive effects. This is
not to say that the human capital approach would do nothing to reduce
waste. Although it would not eliminate the "former employer tax," it
could lower it significantly from its current one hundred percent and,
therefore, reduce the disincentive effects.
One method of avoiding this problem would be to eliminate the effort/
human capital separation and allow the employee to retain all income
from nonsubstitute positions; earnings from nonsubstitute employment
would be regarded as a return to human capital investment. The argu-
ment for this position is that the effort/human capital separation is simply
too difficult, and the risk of being unable to make this allocation should be
borne by the breaching party.'50 The same result would be obtained by
148 See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.25, at 926. Of course, if the new business could be con-
ducted while employed by the original employer, there should be no deduction.
"1 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 40, § 1095, at 517-18, cited in D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.25,
at 926 n.21. See also Williams v. Chicago Coal Co., 60 Ill. 149 (1871). The human capital and
new business cases may be distinguishable in terms of whether expenses involved in the
ventures would be regarded as "reasonable" and, therefore, chargeable to the breaching
employer. Currently, the human capitalist is probably in a less risky position than the in-
dividual who starts a new business and, therefore, does not have a strong argument for
keeping the gains. The position of this article is that the risk of human capital investments
should be borne by the worker/investor.
'* This is the opposite of the solution to the "new business" problem. In those cases, the
difficulty of apportioning is usually borne by the discharged worker, the result being that
the discharging employer is credited with the rewards to both labor and capital. See D.
DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.25, at 926. When there are no reasonable substitutes it seems
logical, in both the new business case and the human capital case, to allow the employee to
retain the total amount earned. The former employer cannot reasonably expect a credit and
the discharged worker would be fully motivated to consider re-entering the labor market.
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arbitrarily assigning a small amount of the extra income to the pure labor
portion of the new venture.
The most serious objection to this solution is that it ignores the fact
that the seller of labor is only able to resell because of the breach.1 51
Although the income associated with the new investment should accrue
to the risk taker, the effort-related income is relatively risk-free and
directly related to the breach. Holding the former employer liable for
the full amount would be punitive in that he would be liable for more
than the damages actually suffered.
An additional problem with the human capital approach is that at-
tempting to apportion a wage into human capital and pure effort com-
ponents would be as difficult as the generally avoided apportioning prob-
lem involved when the discharged worker begins his own business.
Whether inconvenience justifies a position that results in inefficiency is
a decision for the courts and policy makers. If one accepts the theory in-
volved in human capital analysis, though, there are at least two
possibilities. First, at trial, after the defendent/former employer has
shown the amount earned by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the amount that should be apportioned to
human capital. This could be done by using the federal minimum wage,
or some other yardstick, as a rough indicator of the value of low human
capital or effort-intensive work.
Second, a legislatively determined fixed amount, or proportion, could
be retained by the plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff might be allowed
to retain everything in excess of two dollars per hour or fifty percent of
the earnings. There is a strong argument for assigning a small share to
the former employer. From a policy standpoint, once the breach has oc-
curred it is advisable to allow the employee to compare the merits of
work and leisure unimpeded by the previous breach.' 5 Also, this is the
same type of allocation one could expect if the parties were to bargain
over the leisure windfall. '
These suggestions do not begin to apportion accurately the capital
and pure effort components of every new occupation. Their application
.., See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 40, § 1095, at 517 (1964); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
336, comment c (1932).
"I Of course, the new rule may have an impact on whether a breach will occur at all. See
text accompanying notes 163-69 infra.
W5 As noted earlier, when there is a duty to minimize and there are no reasonable
substitutes, the employer/employee relationship resembles that of a bilateral monopoly,
See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra. It seems likely that, all other factors being equal,
any settlement regarding the right to remain idle will permit the former employee to retain
the larger proportion of the income earned. This would result because the employee's
lowest acceptable wage is one that offsets the disutility of the new position. The lowest ac-
ceptable credit to the former employer is anything in excess of zero. Thus, the range of ac-
ceptable solutions is already structured to favor retention of the new employment benefits
by the discharged worker.
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would, however, be a simple matter, and they provide a logical step
toward bringing the measure of damages in these cases in line with
economic reality.
THE COMPENSATED DUTY APPROACH
Both strategies examined in depth, and the alternative of allowing
the discharged worker to retain all income earned from nonsubstitute
positions, include serious shortcomings in finding an equitable and effec-
tive method of avoiding suboptimal leisure.154 An ideal strategy would
be one that recognizes human capital, allows the employee to retain the
benefit of the original bargain and allows him to improve his income
position by the full amount earned in nonsubstitute employment. Of
course, no strategy fulfills all these requirements. It is, however, possi-
ble to approximate the desired result by combining the two approaches
discussed above. The compensated duty rule is designed to expand the
scope of the duty to minimize, allow the employee to retain all income
from nonsubstitute positions and reduce the size of any leisure windfall.
An example will illustrate the approach. Suppose A, the wrongfully
discharged aircraft designer,'5 5 was earning $1,000 per month and had
several months remaining on his contract when he was wrongfully
discharged. If no reasonable substitutes were available, A could remain
idle and collect damages equal to the contract wage. Suppose the ice
cream sundae position were available at $500 per month. Under the ex-
panded duty rule, after a reasonable time A's duty to minimize would
extend to the job of making sundaes, and available earnings, whether
obtained or not, would be credited to his former employer, B. Under the
human capital approach the sundae job would not be within the scope of
A's minimization duty, but if he did take the position he would be able
to retain an amount equal to the newly acquired human capital compo-
nent of the new position. If the components were allocated evenly, he
would retain $250 and B would be credited with $250. A would receive
the equivalent of $1,250 per month and he would, therefore, increase his
income by $250 by accepting the position.
The compensated duty rule reflects the view that there is little
justification for allowing A to retain a fortuitous leisure windfall when
reasonable substitutes are not available. In addition, B should be
credited with the effort share of the income that A could have obtained
'" An expansion of the duty to minimize may reduce the benefit of the original bargain to
the employee. The human capital approach is limited in its impact on suboptimal leisure
because it does not permit the worker to retain all the benefits of re-entry into the labor
force. Denying the defendant any credit for earnings from nonsubstitute employment would
have a punitive effect.
'" See text accompanying notes 140-42 supra.
[Vol. 56:207
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
by going beyond the common law duty to minimize, even if A declined to
do so. Thus, under the rule, A's options would be either to accept the
nonsubstitute employment and receive total income and damages of
$1,250 per month or to decline the employment and receive damages
equal to $750.5'
This approach is attractive for a number of reasons. First, the worker
would make the re-entry decision on the basis of the full amount of
potential income. Unlike the human capital strategy, in which the
discharged worker would compare work disutility with a portion of in-
come, here the worker would be more likely to make his decision in-
dependent of the breach. There is, however, an important difference
between the re-entry decision and the original decision to contract. For
example, although A would compare the ice cream sundae job with $500
income, he would be doing so while being assured of some income
regardless of his decision. If the utility to A of additional income
diminishes as his income increases, the assured income would influence
his decision.'57 The decision would still be superior to that made under
the common law because the worker would compare the value of his
leisure to the value society attributes to his productivity.
An additional advantage of this proposal is that it modifies the all-or-
nothing nature of the common law rule. Under the common law rule, if
the worker declines what is, in fact, a reasonable substitute, his
recovery is reduced by the full amount that he could have earned. On
the other hand, if the worker does accept employment'58 that is not a
reasonable substitute, all of the income is credited to the former
employer. Under the compensated duty approach, the risks involved in
deciding to decline employment would be essentially the same as under
the common law rule. The decision to accept employment would, how-
ever, be less risky than under the common law. If the new position were
a reasonable substitute, the worker would receive the contracted-for
compensation and suffer the contract disutility.19 If it were not a
reasonable substitute, he would still have improved his income position
through the minimization efforts.
1' A would be indifferent to working for $1,000 and not working and receiving $750.
Since the effort components of all positions are the same, see note 143 supra, $250 is the
portion of the $1,000 that compensated A for foregoing leisure. Thus, either work and a
$1,000 income or leisure and a $750 income gives A his expectancy.
"I If the marginal utility of income does not decline over this income range, or if it
declines very slowly, the existence of an assured income would have little or no impact on
the re-employment decision.
"' The likelihood of this would depend on the risk aversion of the discharged worker. A
risk-averse worker would be more likely to accept employment not within the common law
duty to minimize.
"I A reasonable substitute position is one having basically the same disutility as the
original position. A difference between the contract wage and the new wage will be part of
the damages associated with the discharge.
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Although the compensated duty approach does not guarantee protec-
tion of the benefit of the original contract bargain,16 it does, unlike the
expanded duty rule, include some protection for the worker. In the
previous hypothetical, if A declined nonsubstitute employment, under
the expanded duty rule damages would equal $500. Under the compen-
sated duty approach damages would equal $750. Under the expanded
duty rule, if A chose to work, his total income would be $1,000. His in-
come under similar circumstances with the compensated duty rule
would be $1,250. Whether he chose to work or not, he would be more
likely to receive the contracted-for utility surplus under the compen-
sated duty rule.
This is not to say that each individual would wind up with the same
utility as under the original contract. Depending on the effort/human
capital division and one's preference for leisure, it is possible that the
worker would be worse off than under the original contract. 6' On the
other hand, the probabilities of a utility surplus loss or a leisure wind-
fall 2 would not be as skewed as under the expanded duty rule or the
common law rule. Also, the likelihood of optimal work/leisure decisions
should approach that found under the expanded duty rule.'63
One obvious disadvantage of this strategy is that it increases the
minimization risks faced by the discharged worker."" Basically, the
broader duty to minimize forces the discharged worker to determine
"' In theory, the compensated duty approach affords complete protection. If the effort
component of a wage is defined as the minimum amount necessary to induce the worker to
forego leisure and to commit basic human capital to work, see note 144 supra, then the ef-
fort component of all portions would be the same. Thus, under the compensated duty ap-
proach, the worker who does not accept nonsubstitute employment would be left with an
amount equal to the benefit of the bargain plus the portion of the original contract wage
that was associated with the human capital for which there is now no market.
"' Whether the discharged worker's position is improved or not will depend on the wage
obtainable in the next best position and the capital/effort allocation made. Suppose that
under the original contract the employee were earning $300 per month. If he were indif-
ferent to working for $300 per month or not working and receiving $150 per month, the
benefit of the bargain would be $150 per month. Upon discharge assume the next best posi-
tion includes a salary of $200 per month. If the effort/capital division were made on a 50-50
basis, the employee electing not to work would receive $100. He would lose a portion of the
original benefit of the bargain.
The worker may end up better off. Again assume the worker is indifferent between
working for $300 per month and not working and receiving a payment of $150 per month. If
the next best position involved a salary of $350 per month and the capital/labor allocation
were made on a 50-50 basis, the worker could remain idle and receive damages of $175 per
month.
182 Since the worker would not receive the contract wage but an amount equal to the con-
tract wage adjusted for the effort component of alternate employment, the leisure windfall,
if any, would be less than under the common law.
"I As noted earlier, see notes 156-59 & accompanying text supra, the deviation from the
expanded duty rule would depend on the marginal utility of income.
'" These risks were discussed in connection with the Texas rule. See notes 88-90 & ac-
companying text supra.
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how long he must look for comparable employment before expanding
the scope of his search. If he accepts one substitute, he must determine
when a better one becomes available and whether he must move into
the better position. Earlier it was suggested that any problems in these
areas should be resolved in favor of the nonbreaching party. The
compensated duty strategy would further reduce the risks borne by this
party in that if a superior nonsubstitute position were not taken, the
loss to the party who had failed to minimize would only be a portion of
the extra income that could have been earned.1 1
5
THE FREQUENCY OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
The Individual Decision
All of the strategies discussed above tend to decrease damages
associated with an employer's breach when there are no common law
substitutes. The broader duty to minimize and the compensated duty
approach reduce the importance of the substitute/nonsubstitute issue in
a way that favors the employer.66 The human capital approach retains
the common law notion of a reasonable substitute, but creates a situa-
tion in which the breaching party is more likely to escape paying the full
contract wage even when reasonable substitutes are not available.
Precisely how important a decrease in potential damages would be to
the decision to breach is difficult to determine. The rational employer
would choose to terminate the contract when the costs of termination
are less than the costs of maintaining the relationship. The costs of ter-
mination include the present value of the lost revenue contribution'67 of
the worker plus either the cost of litigation and the size of the ex-
pected judgment"8 in a wrongful discharge suit, or the cost of buying
'" No such protection exists if there are reasonable substitutes available which the plain-
tiff fails to accept. Since the employee would not lose all income earned in nonsubstitute
positions, acceptance of nonsubstitutes would become a more attractive method for hedging
against the possibility that reasonable substitutes exist.
I" Under the broader duty to minimize rule the substitute/nonsubstitute issue is of little
consequence. The breaching party will be credited with income obtainable in the closest
substitute. Even here there will be some limit to the duty in the sense that a position
beyond the capacity of, the worker would not be within the scope of the duty. Under the
compensated duty approach, even if there are no reasonable substitutes, the breaching
employer would be credited with a portion of the income obtainable in -nonsubstitutes.
"' The revenue contribution is the revenue generated by the efforts of an employee. It
will be a function of the employee's output and the demand for that output. See generally
C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 427-35 (3d ed. 1978).
The expected judgment would equal:
L Ser -[K) + pS (K )+S (1 - I) (K -
where: P V n P V P
L = the probability of the discharge being deemed wrongful
S = the probability that the court will find that reasonable substitutes exist
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the employee's contract rights. The cost of continuing includes the pre-
sent value of contracted-for salary payments. Algebraically, the expres-
sion can be stated to indicate that the contract will be terminated when:
gv>- RCpv + Tc
where:
Kpv = the present value of contracted-for wage
payments
RCpv = the productivity of the worker measured in terms
of the dollor value of extra revenue he generates
for the firm
Tc  = either the costs of litigation and the size of the ex-
pected judgment in a wrongful discharge action,
or the cost of purchasing the employee's contract
rights whichever is lower.
Several aspects of the model require further explanation. First, T
takes the lower of the two values since the employer will have a choice
between the cost of litigation plus expected judgment or the settlement
payment. Second, the analysis assumes that the employer is a profit
maximizer in the traditional sense. In many instances the buyer of labor
may not maximize profit but will apply a more general measure of his or
her utility."9 In these instances, the employer may dismiss or refuse to
hire an individual or a group of individuals for reasons unrelated to pro-
ductivity. When the action is sexually or racially motivated, economists
say that the employer has a "taste for discrimination.""'7 Of course,
wrongful discharge may also occur for noneconomic reasons unrelated
to race or sex."1 In all of these cases, the employer attributes disutility
to the continued employment of the individual. These nonmonetary
costs are so high that the revenue contribution is insufficient to assure
continued employment. In order to fit this possibility into the model,
the value of KPV would have to reflect both monetary and psychic costs
of continued employment. In addition, if reinstatemeht is one of the
possible outcomes of litigation, the psychic costs of this would be includ-
ed as part of the expected judgment.
K ~V = the present value of contracted-for wage payments
Wv = the present value of wages in substitute position ((Kpv - Wp,)takes a
value of zero when W > Kp )
Sn  = the probability that the court will find that substitutes do not existI = the probability that the employee will remain idle
Rpv = the present value of wages obtainable in nonsubstitute positions.
169 See A. REES, supra note 10, at 181-84.
170 See, e.g., G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1957).
"' Actually, all discharge rationales are "economic" in a broad sense. "Noneconomic"
refers to matters which are unrelated to actual productivity and salary.
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Another complication arises from the fact that any change in the
remedy will be affected by the possibility that the breach may not be
deemed wrongful and the further possibility that high paying common
law substitutes may exist. Ultimately, however, the possibility of hav-
ing to pay the full contract wage will enter into the employer's estimate
of T.111 Likewise, the possibility of collecting the full contract wage
should be part of the employee's determination of the price at which he
will sell his contract rights.
Because all of the strategies involve a lower expected cost if the
employer elects to breach, the probability of termination by either
wrongful discharge or settlement will increase. The reason for this can
be understood by referring to the formulation presented above. Another
way of expressing the original proposition is that the decision will be to
terminate when:
K - RCpv> T
The employer will breach or agree to terminate if the difference be-
tween cost of continued employment (Kpv) and benefits from future
employment (RCpv) exceeds termination costs. This difference con-
stitutes a ceiling on what the employer is willing to pay either in the
form of expected litigation losses or settlement payments.
The possibility of lower damages increases the probability that the
costs of litigation and the expected judgment will fall under the
termination-cost ceiling. The change in damages, however, is also likely
to alter the relative bargaining strengths of the employer/buyer and the
employee/seller in the bilateral monopoly."' The alteration, in favor of
the employer, increases the probability that the price the employee is
willing to accept will fall below the ceiling. Thus, the prospect of a lower
judgment will lower both possible values of T and increase the
likelihood that the contract will be terminated either by wrongful
discharge or by mutual consent.
The Question of Efficiency
A separate issue from that of the individual employer's response to
such a change is whether increasing the probability of termination is ef-
ficient overall. The ideal remedial scheme, in terms of economic efficien-
cy, encourages the employer to breach or otherwise terminate only
when his position is improved and the expectancy of the employee pro-
172 See note 165 supra.
", Both the buyer of the contract rights (the employer) and the seller (the employee)
would realize that the option of not settling, but breaching, would now be more attractive
to the buyer. In terms of the bilateral monopoly, the bargaining strength of the buyer
would be improved.
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tected."4 It is with respect to this standard that the common law and
suggested alternatives are evaluated.
The Common Law
There is a clear possibility under the common law that the contract
will not be terminated when it is efficient to do so. This is because the
common law puts the employee in a superior bargaining position in his
bilateral monopoly relationship with the employer. The following
hypothetical illustrates the problem. Suppose A is hired at a monthly
salary of $1,200 and the benefit of the bargain to A is such that he would
be indifferent to continued employment and a cash payment of $500 per
month. In addition, suppose that A's revenue contribution falls from
$1,200 per month to $600 per month. In this case the employer, B, wishes
to terminate the contract and would be willing to pay A up to $600 for
A's contract rights or for litigation expenses and damages. This would
protect A's benefit of the bargain and lower the total costs or produc-
tion."7 5 A, on the other hand, would regard $500 as the lowest acceptable
price because, if found to be wrongfully discharged, he is assured of
maintaining this utility surplus position.' 6 It seems that the bilateral
monopoly solution would be between $500 and $600 for the worker's con-
tract rights. Any price in this range leaves both A and B better off than
under the contract.
Under the common law, the model is complicated in that if the
employer anticipates that the discharge will be deemed wrongful and
there are no reasonable substitutes, termination by breach will be par-
ticularly unattractive."' This strengthens the employee's bargaining
.. See Barton, The Economic Bases of Damages for Breach of Contrac 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 277, 277-79 (1972). Of course, the issue of efficiency is different from that of fairness.
Although economists have documented the costs to individuals and to society of discrimina-
tion, see generally R. LEFTWICH & A. SHARP, ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL ISSUES 231-47 (rev. ed.
1976); Betsy, Differences in Unemployment Experience Between Blacks and Whites, 68
AM. ECON. REV., May, 1978, at 192; Barret & Morgenstern, Why Do Blacks and Women
Have High Unemployment Rates?, 9 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 452 (1974); Gwartney,
Discrimination and Income Differentials, 60 AM. ECON. REV., June, 1976, at 396, there is a
question as to whether discrimination is really inefficient, see R. POSNER, supra note 7, at
533-38. In any case, laws concerning the prohibition of discrimination appear to be made on
the basis of normative judgments going beyond the issues of economic efficiency.
,,5 By terminating the contract with A, B's costs would decrease by $1,200. B could then
replace the lost output by hiring a replacement at a maximum wage of $600 and pay A the
$500 benefit of the bargain. In total, B's cost would decline by $100 and production would
remain the same.
. See notes 42-43 & accompanying text supra.
" The actual damages expected by the breaching employer would be determined by the
factors included in the equation presented in note 168 supra. If the discharge were for
economic reasons, as hypothesized, it seems safe to assume that both the employer and the
employee would assign a value to L (the probability that the discharge will be found to be
wrongful) approaching one. Of course, this would vary between parties based on their risk
aversion and knowledge of the judicial process.
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position as the monopoly seller of his contract rights and increases the
probability that he will demand more than $500 for these rights. Thus,
there may be no termination even though the situation is one in which A
could be fully compensated and B's production costs would decline.
The Expanded Duty to Minimize Rule
The broader duty to minimize rule errs in the opposite direction from
the common law rule. Assuming that both parties expected the
discharge to be deemed wrongful, the highest offer by the employer
would be just equal to the difference between the contract wage and
any expected wage from alternate employment. The bargaining power
of the employee would be severely reduced since the law would not pro-
tect his benefit of the bargain or create the possibility of a leisure wind-
fall. The employer may then be able to use his monopsony power in such
a way as to buy the contract rights at a price that would be less than
A's expectancy.
In the original hypothetical, suppose A were still indifferent to con-
tinued employment or a $500 cash payment. If his revenue contribution
had dropped from $1,200 to $800, as opposed to $600, the most the
employer would be willing to pay for the contract rights would be $400.
Given that his duty to minimize extends beyond reasonable substitutes
and, perhaps, to high-paying but relatively unpleasant forms of employ-
ment, A may accept less than $500 for his rights."8 In short, B would be
in a position to breach or otherwise terminate even though his savings
would not be sufficient to compensate A for his expectancy. This is not
to say that the employee would never receive a surplus equal to that
under the original contract. The problem is that the remedy is not
designed to assure him of the contracted-for surplus.
The Human Capital Approach
Under the human capital approach, any inefficiency in contract ter-
mination is likely to be in the direction of terminating too infrequently.
The employee's original benefit of the bargain would be fully protected
and, if there were no reasonable substitutes, he could opt to receive the
Similarly, the parties may differ in their estimates of the other factors affecting the ex-
pected damage award. If their estimates were different, the expected damages suffered by
the breaching employer and the expected recovery of the discharged worker would have an
impact upon their negotiating posture in the bilateral monopoly and would alter the results.
Regardless of the estimates of the factors in the equation, the common law full contract
wage remedy will have the influence noted in the text.
"' In such a case the employee may be willing to settle for an amount which does not
equal the utility surplus under the contract as his options, should there be a breach, will
leave him in an inferior utility position.
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full contract wage.179 Furthermore, the employee would retain all the
monopoly power he had under the common law. He would, therefore, be
unwilling to accept a settlement offer which amounted to less than his
expectancy and he would be in a position to demand more.
The frequency of termination may vary from that under the common
law rule for two reasons. First, although the employee would possess
the same monopoly power as under the common law rule, he may de-
mand a somewhat lower price for his contract rights, depending upon
the attractiveness of alternative human capital investment oppor-
tunities. Second, the expected judgment in the case of a discharge would
be less than under the common law rule.18 While the worker would not
settle for less than expectancy, he would appear to be less likely to de-
mand a price in excess of the employer's ceiling than he would under the
common law.
The Compensated Duty Rule
The compensated duty alternative represents an attempt to protect
the benefit of the employee's bargain while limiting the ability of the
employee to demand a price for his contract rights in excess of expec-
tancy. The employee's monopoly power would be reduced in that the
employee could not remain idle and collect the full contract wage. The
probability would be higher than under the common law that the
employee would seek alternative employment, even when reasonable
substitutes did not exist. This would decrease the price of the
employee's contract rights and increase the likelihood, vis h vis the com-
mon law rule, that the price would be below the employer's settlement
ceiling. If the employee insisted on a price outside the settlement range,
the probabilities would be greater than under the common law that the
litigation cost plus expected judgment would fall within the acceptable
range. 8 '
Contract termination would occur more frequently under the compen-
sated duty rule than under the common law rule and any leisure wind-
fall would be less. The question remains, however, whether employers
would terminate even though their savings were not at least equal to
' This would be a function of the attractiveness of alternative employment and the an-
ticipated effort/capital division.
," The employer may escape paying the full contract wage even if substitutes do not
exist. In the expected damage equation, see note 168 supra, the value assigned to I (the
probability of remaining idle) would decrease. Still, if employers adopt the "maximin"
strategy, the decision would be not to breach. Under this strategy, a risk-averse employer
trying to decide whether he would be better off by breaching or not breaching the contract
would look to see what the worst possible outcome of each choice would be and then choose
the best worst possible outcome.
... In the equation, see note 168 supra, the value of I would decrease and K in the ex-
pression will be replaced by Kpv - E where E is the effort component of te next best
available employment.
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the employee's expectancy. The compensated duty rule would create
some uncertainty for the worker in terms of the consequences of refus-
ing to sell his contract rights and might, therefore, affect his ability to
negotiate a settlement equal to his expectancy. Furthermore, although
in theory he would be fully protected, '82 practical problems would create
greater risks than under the common law that he would not receive a
fully compensatory judgment if he refused to sell his contract rights.'83
Although his bargaining position would not be as strong as under the
common law, the risks associated with demanding an expectancy price
for his contract rights would be less than under the expanded duty rule, in
that if he were discharged in a market without reasonable substitutes, he
would receive a larger portion of his prior salary. Moreover, if the
employer did breach, the employee would have an option. He would be en-
titled to the full contract wage minus a portion of the income obtainable
in the most reasonable substitute. '84 He could, in addition, elect to col-
lect this amount and work in any other nonsubstitute position and re-
tain the full amount of income obtained. Although none of these
possibilities includes the built-in protection of the common law rule,
unlike the expanded duty rule, nothing in the scheme seems to create a
situation in which there is any particular barrier to achieving the
original utility expectancy." 5
CONCLUSION
The common law remedies in wrongful discharge cases are designed
to protect the expectancy of the discharged party. Consequently, the
duty to minimize damages extends only to positions that are reasonable
substitutes. The discharging party, however, is credited with any gains
made possible by the discharge even in nonsubstitute positions. As a
result, there is little motivation for the wrongfully discharged worker to
accept nonsubstitute employment. This is true even though the value of
the leisure that the worker would forego by accepting nonsubstitute
" See note 160 supra.
" Under the common law, if he elects not to work, he would receive the full contract
wage and would be certain to receive his expectancy. Under the compensated duty rule, he
would not receive the contracted-for wage and, depending on the effort/human capital divi-
sion and his own preferences, might not receive the expectancy.
I" If the effort component were calculated correctly, he would be in the same utility posi-
tion as under the contract. See notes 144 & 160 supra.
"I Two basic changes are involved. First, the common law assurance of not falling below
the contract utility surplus would be eliminated because the employee would rely on the
court to make the correct effort/capital division. Given the difficulty in making judgments
about utility, it is unlikely that the decision would be correct for any one individual. The
common law assurances would be replaced by a group of alternatives, any of which could
achieve the same result. Second, the employee bias inherent in the common law would be
eliminated.
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employment is less than the value of his effort in these positions. Fur-
thermore, the common law rule may have the effect of discouraging con-
tract termination even when termination would protect the employee's
benefit of the bargain and lower the employer's production costs. Three
alternatives to the traditional remedial scheme have been suggested
and evaluated in terms of their impact on suboptimal leisure and the ef-
ficiency of contract termination.
Under the expanded duty to minimize rule, the employee would be
permitted to restrict his search to the scope of common law reasonable
substitutes for a limited period of time. After this time, the defendant
would be credited with income obtainable in other positions for which
the plaintiff was suited. The expanded duty rule would decrease the ex-
pected judgment associated with a wrongful discharge and reduce the
bargaining power of the employee as a monopoly seller of his contract
rights. In terms of the employer's decision to terminate, the employee's
expectancy would be in jeopardy since the question of whether the sav-
ings to the employer would be sufficient to fully compensate the
employee would not be of consequence.
The human capital approach recognizes that nonsubstitute employ-
ment may involve a new investment in the worker's productive
capabilities. Traditionally, the worker who accepted a new position
would be permitted to recover the cost of this investment, if reasonable,
from the breaching party. Although the employee is reimbursed for the
investment, he is not permitted to retain any of the returns. Thus, there
is little motivation to make human capital investments in nonsubstitute
occupations. Under the human capital approach, the worker would be
permitted to retain a portion of the income earned in nonsubstitute posi-
tions and the defendant would not be liable for expenses incurred in
making these investments.
The human capital approach would increase the likelihood that
discharged workers would accept nonsubstitute employment so that the
expected judgment for the wrongful discharge would be less than under
the common law. The benefit of the bargain would still be overly pro-
tected, as under common law. Thus, the worker would be able to pre-
vent a settlement even though the savings to the discharging employer
would be sufficient to fully compensate the employee for his expectancy.
The final proposal-the compensated duty rule-combines aspects of
the other two approaches. The wrongfully discharged worker who did
not accept nonsubstitute employment would receive the contracted-for
wage minus a portion of the amount obtainable in nonsubstitute posi-
tions. If he accepted a nonsubstitute position, he would receive this
amount and would be permitted to retain all income from the non-
substitute work. The objective is to place the discharged worker in a
position in which he compares the value of leisure with society's valua-
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tion of his productive skills. The employee is also less likely to be able to
demand a price for his contract rights in excess of his expectancy.
Of the three approaches, the compensated duty rule is particularly at-
tractive. Its effectiveness at decreasing suboptimal leisure rivals that of
the expanded duty rule. On the other hand, the employee's benefit of
the bargain would be more secure. Finally, the compensated duty rule
holds great promise for encouraging efficient employment contract ter-
mination.
Implementation of the plans in a manner consistent with the theories
illustrated would be extremely difficult. However, the rule that workers
in nonsubstitute positions should be permitted to retain some or all of
the income obtained would be simple to implement. The approaches
discussed here provide a basis for doing so and, in light of the deficien-
cies of the current rule, deserve careful consideration. They are offered
as points of departure for further consideration of a more equitable and
efficient wrongful discharge remedy.

